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Judicial Review in the Contemporaiy Wlorld. By Mauro Cappelletti.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1971. Pp. xv, 117. $8.50.
Professor Cappelletti, one of Italy's most distinguished procedural
law scholars, has completed an important comparative study of the
practice of judicial review in many nations, focusing primarily on
Western Europe and the United States.' His point of view is highly
theoretical; his perspective, broad and provocative. Compressed into
100 pages of text and detailed footnotes is a wealth of information on
a variety of legal systems and techniques.
I
In the first part of his book, Professor Cappelletti deftly traces the
development of judicial review from the ancient Athenians to John
Marshall. This historical analysis is presented in terms of the classic
Hegelian dialectic, complete with thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.2
The first stage, or thesis, was "natural justice," essentially the "right
reason" of Greco-Roman law, generously infused with Christian the-
ology, and epitomized by the Thomistic doctrine that an unjust law
is not law at all.3 The necessity for positive law's conformance with
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1. M. CAPPELLErrI, JUDICIAL R VIEW IN THE Co.Mra-sioR., WORLD vi-x (1971)
[hereinafter cited as CArPELLLTr]. See also Cappelletti, The Significance of Judicial
Review of Legislation in the Contemporary World, in Ius Pa ,rTu.nt GE,iu.t 147, 155.57
(E. von Caemmerer, S. Mentshikoff & K. Zweigert eds. 1969).
For other comparative studies of judicial review see MA.x PLNcE Issrr Fun Aus-
LANDISCHES OFFENTILICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECuT, VMRFAMsUNGScELIC1MS-ARKEIT kv
Dmn GEGENWART (H. Mosler ed. 1962); E. MCWIIINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW (.4th ed. 1969);
J. OTIO-% SIDOU, Do MANDADO DE SEGURANcA 101-223 (3d ed. 1969); E. VEscovI, EL POCESO
DE INCONsTrrucIoNALIDAD DE LA LEY (1967); H. ZA.IuDo, V'iNICINCO A.N6s DE EVOLU.
C16N DE LA JusTricA CoNsTrruCIONAL 1940-1965 (1968); Geck, Judicial Review of Statutes:
A Comparative Survey of Present Institutions and Practices, 51 CoEN.LL L.Q. 250 (1966).
2. CAPPLWITI viii-FS.S. HX BASiI 'VKITNcS OF ST. THO.tAS AqUinAS 784 (A. Pegis ed. 1945).
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"natural law" was asserted by philosopher-jurists during this stage. But
there existed no enforcement mechanism, except for an occasional
judicial pronouncement or rebellion. 4 The second stage, or antithesis,
was "legal justice," the legal positivism which continues to dominate
French and English constitutional practice. This view was embodied
in England's Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the French Revolution
of 1789, when the populace rejected any judicial restraint on legislative
sovereignty. "Legal justice" was
characterized by the primacy of the written statute and the popu-
lar legislature, and the relative powerlessness of both judges and
natural law theory to control this primacy.6
Finally, in the third stage, "constitutional justice" synthesized the
two preceding stages by "positivizing" natural law precepts in written,
"rigid" constitutions; and by entrusting the judiciary with the task
of determining whether laws violated constitutional provisions.0 This
last stage began in 1803 with Marbury v. Madison,7 although as Pro-
fessor Cappelletti carefully notes:
[M]ore than a century of American history and a strong line of
precedents-to say nothing of contemporary writings-stood be-
hind Chief Justice Marshall in 1803 when ... he enunciated "the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void; and that Courts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."
Cappelletti contends that this pattern of articulating "higher law" in
a written constitution enforced by the judiciary is a world-wide trend,
a development which the author later labels the "judicial review ex-
plosion."9
4. The most famous English example of such pronouncement appeared in Coke's
dictum in Bonham's Case in 1610: "that in many cases, the common law will conitroul
acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when all act
of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will controul it and adjudge it to be void." 8 Coke's
Reports 107, 118, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610).
5. CAPPELLErri 42.
6. Although Cappelletti does not define "positivization," his use of the term seems
to imply not only the written articulation of a principle, but also its enactment by
some legally competent authority. The distinction between "rigkl" and "flexible" con-
stitutions is between constitutions which are not subject to change or revision through
the ordinary laws (but are changeable, if at all, only by a special amending procedure)
and those which can be changed through ordinary legislative processes. Id. at 25.26.
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. CAl'rx~rrs 41.
9. Id. at 42-43.
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Professor Cappelletti argues that systems of judicial review may be
classified as either "decentralized" or "centralized." The decentralized
system, whose archetype is the United States, gives the power to de-
termine constitutional issues to the entire judiciary. The centralized
system, whose archetype is the system established by the Austrian
Constitution of 1920, restricts exercise of this power to a special con-
stitutional court. The first is associated primarily with common law
countries, the second with civil law nations. Cappelletti places the
United States, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, and Norway in
the decentralized camp. He includes Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Italy,
and Turkey in the centralized camp. A few countries, such as Mexico,
Switzerland, Ireland and India, fall somewhere between the two.0
The difference between the two systems goes beyond which judicial
organs, special or ordinary, perform the function of judicial review.
The effect of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, accord-
ing to Cappelletti, is very different in centralized and decentralized
systems." In a centralized system, such a decision has an erga omnes
effect, invalidating the law for everyone, just as if it had been abro-
gated by the legislature. The effect in a decentralized system is more
complex. Strictly speaking, a decision in a decentralized system gen-
erally has binding effect only upon the parties in the specific case,
or inter partes.12 However, since such systems are usually found in
common law nations, the doctrine of stare decisis may widen the
practical effect of judicial review.13
10. Swiss judges, whether cantonal or federal, have a general power and duty to
disregard cantonal laws which violate the Federal Constitution, but they have no power
to determine the constitutionality of federal laws. There also exists in Switzerland a
direct action to challenge the constitutionality of cantonal legislation (staaltsrechlliche
Beschwerde or recours de droit public) which will lie only before the Federal Tribunal.
J. Roussy, LE CONTROLE JUDICLIRE DE Lx CONsrurtONNALrrE DES Lots FEDanALES Aux
ETATS-UNIS ET EN SUISSE 126, 12847 (1969). The power of judicial review in Mexico is
confined to the federal judiciary, which has authority to suspend the effects of an tun-
constitutional statute in a particular case via the remedy of amparo. The state judcs
have no power to issue writs of amparo. Coirrrruca6N PoLtmcA arts. 103, 107 (Me-xtco
1917). In Ireland the power of judicial review is restricted to two courts: the High
Court and the Supreme Court; the lower courts have no such power. J.M. Kau.,
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE IRISH LAW AND CONSTrTUTION ,. 16, 26 (2d ed. 1957). Indian
lower courts may decide constitutional questions only if there has been aprior inter-
pretation by their High Courts or the Supreme Court of India. If no such prior in-
terpretation exists, the inferior courts must submit the constitutional question to the
High Court. Geck, supra note 1, at 256.
11. CAPPuLLrn 85.
12. Id. at 86.
13. To some extent, this latter effect will depend on whether a law is held to be
unconstitutional as applied or on its face; in the latter case, the law is normally inap-
plicable to anyone. Kauper, Judicial Review of Constitutional Issues in the United
States, in 36 MlAx-PLAcK-IN rrrur FOR AUStANDsCtES OFFE.TLICIIES RECrr UND V6n-
RacHT, supra note 1, at 568, 611.
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The two systems also have developed different techniques for raising
constitutional questions. In the decentralized system, constitutional
issues are presented by private parties in connection with actual liti-
gation, a type of review which Professor Cappelletti labels incidenter "I
The centralized system, as it first developed in Austria in 1920, totally
divorced judicial review from normal litigation. Under this type of
review, which Cappelletti labels principaliter, constitutional issues
could be raised only by the federal executive or state governments in
abstract ad hoc proceedings brought directly before the Constitutional
Court. 15
Professor Cappelletti argues that three aspects of the civil law tra-
dition account for its development of a distinct pattern of judicial
review. First, civil law countries have adhered to a more rigid doctrine
of separation of powers, in which judicial review is regarded as a
political function for which the ordinary courts are unsuited. Second,
civil law nations have not developed a doctrine of stare decisis and
therefore have no doctrinal assurance against conflicting opinions.
Finally, the traditional civil law judiciary is less suited to judicial
review as it consists of career judges unaccustomed to policy-making
decisions. For these reasons, according to Cappelletti, decentralized
review in civil law countries has generally failed.16
II
Although Professor Cappelletti uses this framework skillfully to
discuss a variety of legal institutions and techniques, the theory con-
tains some fundamental ambiguities. Cappelletti, for example, never
defines "natural law" or "higher law"-terms used interchangeably,
and somewhat confusingly, throughout the work. Nor does he justify
his contention that constitutionalism is merely the "positivization" of
common law. Not even "judicial review" is clearly defined, and
Cappelletti's use of the term seems to exclude some of the important
techniques and practices which courts apply in constitutional inter-
pretation.1 7 These terms have developed complex connotations over
14. CAPPELLETrI 73-74.
15. Id. at 69-71, 75.
16. Id. at 59, 63-64.
17. The author seems to restrict his use of the term "judicial review" to judicial
determinations of the constitutionality of legislation on its face. It is not clear whether
this concept would encompass a decision like Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1866),
where the Supreme Court held that a statute was unconstitutional as aJplled, or a
decision like Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962), where the Court in effect re.
wrote a federal statute to avoid constitutional doubts. Nor is it clear whether judicial
1414
Vol. 81: 1411, 1972
Judicial Review: Old and New
the years, and Cappelletti might have dealt with them more precisely
and clearly. He also might have explained how the historical devel-
opment of judicial review in common law countries differed from
that in civil law nations18 Moreover, his entire set of classifications
seems to exaggerate the differences between the two systems. Indeed,
the principaliter pattern of judicial review in its pure form (as de-
scribed by Professor Cappelletti) existed in only one country, Austria,
from 1920 to 1929.19 Weren't the two systems more like each other-
from the beginnings of judicial review-than Cappelletti's analysis
would indicate?
But perhaps the major defect of Cappelletti's analysis is his failure
to look beyond the form and outward appearances of institutions to
their actual power and functioning. Abstract discussion of institutional
arrangements without consideration of the political and social con-
texts in which they operate cannot justify conclusions about the actual
effectiveness of judicial review in particular societies. Nowhere does
Cappelletti discuss the distinctive cultural or political forces of the
national systems which he analyzes. He cites, for example, Weimar
Germany and post-World War II Italy and Japan as failures in judicial
review. But these failures can hardly be attributed solely to the use
of civil law and the conditions associated therewith. All three nations
were undergoing postwar dislocations, and all three were experiment-
ing with essentially novel internal orders established largely by vic-
torious nations. Cappelletti also cites the relative insignificance of
judicial review in certain Scandinavian civil law countries-Norway
Denmark and Sweden.2 0 But again, Scandinavian nations have other
review would encompass Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, reh. denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
where the Supreme Court held that exclusionary rule against admission of illegally
obtained evidence applicable to the states; or Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), where the Court decided that the President had e.xceeded
his constitutional authority by assuming managerial powers over the steel industry.
18. In Europe, for example, the Austrian constitution of 1920, written principally
by Hans Kelsen, was the first civil law provision (outside the separate and rather
special development of the Swiss richterliches Prilfungsrecht) to establish a s)stem of
judicial review. What was the background for this novel development in Austria and
other countries? Cappelletti might have discussed antecedents of judicial re iew in
jurisprudential theories and in Austrian court practices. He provides a full discussion
of Marbury, but virtually ignores the historical antecedents of judicial resiew in civil
law countries, except for a catalogue of technical devices and developments in the
Austrian system after 1920. See CAPPELLErTI 53-63.
19. A constitutional amendment was adopted in Austria in 1929 providing for review
of constitutional issues upon application from the highest ordinary and administratihe
court whenever a pending case involved a statute of doubtful constitutionality. Germany
and Italy have expanded this incidenter aspect of the Austrian system to permit all
ordinary courts to stay cases involving constitutional issues and seek their resolution
from the constitutional courts.
20. C Pr.LLrr 59.
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characteristics that undercut Cappelletti's conclusions: First, they are
remarkable for their political and social stability; second, they have
effective non-judicial institutions to resolve social disputes.2'1
Cappelletti also fails to analyze the practical problem of vindicating
constitutional rights under various systems and procedures. There is
only a rather abbreviated treatment of three specialized procedures
-habeas corpus,22 amparo,-3 and Verfassungsbeschwerde2 '-by which
citizens may challenge abridgements of constitutional rights. There
is no assessment of either their effectiveness in obtaining rapid judicial
determination or the efficacy of judicial remedies in correcting par-
ticular injuries and discouraging arbitrary government action. Deal-
ing with such issues requires an inquiry into the actual use of the
procedures.
A particularly important political factor which Cappelletti fails to
consider is the existence of semi-autonomous governmental subdivi-
sions within a federal system. Arguably, one reason for judicial review
under such a federalist system is to insure that the actions of state or
regional legislatures conform to the federal constitution. 26 Unchecked
unconstitutional action by state or regional governments may pose
a real threat to the very existence of the federal state. The American
and Swiss experiences both bear out Justice Holmes' oft-quoted ob-
servation:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we
lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration
as to the laws of the several States.20
21. The most important nonjudicial institution operating in Scandinavian countries
is the ombudsman. For a general discussion of the operation of Scandinavian ombudsmen
see W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE COUN TRIES
(1966). Gellhom discusses the systems of Denmark, id. at 1-47; Finland, id. at 48.90;
Norway, id. at 154-93; Sweden, id. at 194-255. In these countries, the ombudsmans can
intervene to protect citizens' interests in cases of abuse of discretion by courts, as well
as by administrative agencies. Id. at 12, 59, 164, 216, 237-39. In Sweden, where the
ombudsman's powers over the courts seem broadest, review sometimes may cover the
merits of the judgment, as well as the judge's decisions of procedure. Id. at 238,
22. CAPPELLLr 19-20.
23. Id. at 20-22.
24. Id. at 22-23.
25. Professor Freund strongly suggests that this is so. Freund, Review and Fed.
eralism, in SUm'REME COURT AND SUPREME LAw 86, 87-89 (E. Cahn ed. 1954).
26. Holmes, Law and the Court in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUsTIcE HOLMES .187,
390 (M. Lerner ed. 1943). For a comparative discussion of some of the special problems
of federalism and judicial review see W. WAGNER, TmE FEDERAL STATES AND TlHIlt
JUDICmARY 73-130 (1959).
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III
Cappelletti's categories and theories-despite their general analytical
value-fail to fit the experience of judicial review in many Latin
American nations. Indeed, except for a brief discussion of the Mexican
amparo, he ignores Latin America entirely. In most of these countries
an American model of judicial review has been grafted on to a civil
law base; they are thus civil law systems with decentralized review.
Cappelletti argues that such systems in general will be short-lived and
inconsequential. But the experience of certain Latin American nations
would seem to suggest the contrary.2 7 Judicial review has existed in
some of them for nearly a century and has played a significant role
in protecting individual rights.
Judicial review in most Latin American countries could be classified
as decentralized; only one has a system that could be classified as
purely centralized. 28 Eight, however, have systems that are neither
truly centralized nor decentralized under Cappelletti's analysis. Seven
are hybrids, restricting the power of judicial review to the highest
regular court instead of entrusting it to a special constitutional court.-,3
Mexico represents a different kind of hybrid, restricting the power
of judicial review to the federal judiciary.30
Similarly, in terms of techniques of presenting constitutional ques-
tions, many Latin American countries defy Cappelletti's categories.
Colombia, for example, has a decentralized system coupled with a
review procedure known as an accion popular which permits any
citizen, irrespective of a personal stake or exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to challenge the constitutionality of any law by filing with
the Colombian Supreme Court a simple written statement of the
27. See generally J. GRANT, EL CONTROL JuRisDIcciONAL DE LA CONSrrnvcIONALID
DE LAs LEYES (1963); Camargo, The Right to Judicial Protection: "Amnparo" and Other
Latin American Remedies for the Protection of Human Rights, 3 L,4lVVan OF THlE AMER.
IcAs 191, 195-97 (1971); Elder, Judicial Review in Latin America, 21 Oto Sr. L.J. 570
(1960).
28. The Court of Constitutionality in Guatemala consists of twelve judges; fic arc
drawn from the Supreme Court and seven from two lower courts. Thus, despite a
centralized system, the ordinary judiciary actually decides constitutional questions
while wearing different hats. Actions to annul a statute may be brought by the Council
of State, the Bar Association, the Public Ministry, or a person aggrieved by the statute
(provided he is represented by at least ten practicing lawyers). Co.srrr=cto.N arts. 262.65
(Guatemala 1965).
29. CoNsrrruc16N Po~iricA art. 86 (1925, amended 1943, 1957, 1959, 1967) (Chile);
Cos-rrruc6N PoLTixcA art. 10 (1949, amended 1963) (Costa Rica); Co.srrrcciN POnfic.A
art. 96 (El Salvador 1962); CONsTrruCI6N PoLincA arts. 234 & 235 (Honduras 1965);
CoNsrrruc16N POLiTIcA art. 167 (1946 Panama 1946); CosrrrciO6 PoI.hicA arts. 239,
256 (Uruguay 1967); CoNsTrnuc16N POLirICA art 215(3) (Venezuela 1961).
30. Cotsrrruci6N PoL'rIcA arts. 103, 107 (Mexico 1917).
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asserted conflict between the law and the constitution. 31 If tile statute
is declared unconstitutional, the decision has an erga omnes effect.
The law is not technically annulled, but it cannot be enforced there.
after.32 The Colombian system thus has characteristics of both the
centralized and decentralized forms.
Several Latin American nations have another form of judicial con-
trol under which a bill passed over a presidential veto based on con-
stitutional grounds is sent directly to the nation's Supreme Court for
an opinion.33 The Supreme Court, performing a role similar to that
of the French non-judicial Conseil Constitutionnel, must approve the
bill as constitutional before it may be promulgated as law. This antici-
patory function in a decentralized system seems inconsistent with Cap-
pelletti's analysis.
A decision of unconstitutionality in a decentralized system, accord-
ing to Cappelletti, operates only inter partes.3 4 In Latin America,
however, a wider range of legal effects is frequently associated with
such a decision. In Argentina, for example, a declaration of uncon-
stitutionality by the Supreme Court of Justice technically binds only
the parties to the case, 35 but as in the United States, the operation of
stare decisis (albeit slightly diluted) tends to give the court's decision
an erga omnes effect.36 In Mexican amparo litigation five consecutive
decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court will establish a case law
rule (jurisprudencia), which is binding upon the entire Mexican
judiciary.3 7 In Brazil a declaration of unconstitutionality also operates
31. CONsTITUCIN POLITICA art. 214(2) (1886, amended 1969) (Colombia), See generally
Grant, Judicial Control of the Constitutionality of Statutes and Administrative Legis.
lation in Colombia: Nature and Evolution of the Present System, 23 So. CALIF. L. REv.
484, 496-504 (1950).
32. L. SACHICA, CONSTITUCIONALISNMO COLOMBIANO 124-30 (2d ed. 1966).
33. CONSTITUC16N POLiTiCA art. 90 (1886, amended 1969) (Colombia) CONstIrt1c16N
POLiTIcA art. 151 (Ecuador 1967); CONSTrTUC16N POLiTIcA art. 53 (El Salvador 1962);
CONSTITUCI6N POLiTXcA art. 243 (Honduras 1965); CoNsTiTuci6n PoLiTieA art. 229 (18)(1950, amended 1955, 1959, 1962) (Nicaragua); CONSrITUCI6N 1'OLITICA art. 131 (1916,
amended 1956) (Panama); CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA art. 173 (Venezuela 1961). A siuilar
procedure is employed in Costa Rica, but a two-thirds vote of the Supreme Court Is
necessary to reject the bill on constitutional grounds. CONSTrIruci6N I'OLfrlCA art. 128
(1949, amended 1963) (Costa Rica).
34. CAPPELLETrI 86.
35. Anibal Abalos v. Provincia de Mendoza, 255 Fallos 262, 263 [1963-1V] J.A. 22
(1963).
36.. S. V. Linares Quintana, I DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL E INSTITUCIONES 1'OLIrICAS
666-68 (1968); CONsrITucI6N POLiTICA art. 9 (Provincia de Chaco 1957); CoNSTITUCI6N
POLiTvcA art. 126 (10)c (Provincia de Santiago del Estero 1939).
37. LEY DE AMPARO arts. 192-94 (as amended in 1968) (Mexico). A case law rule
established by the Supreme Court sitting en bane binds the entire judiciary; a rule
established by a chamber of the Supreme Court binds that chamber and the lower
courts; and a rule established by a Collegiate Circuit Court binds that court and the
inferior courts within its territorial jurisdiction.
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inter partes, but since 1934 the Senate has been constitutionally ob-
ligated to suspend, either in whole or in part, statutes which have
been declared unconstitutional by final decision of the Supreme Fed-
eral Tribunal.38
The experience of four Latin American countries in particular-
Colombia, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil-indicates that civil law
judges are sometimes capable of carrying out the complex role of
judicial review with considerable courage and substantial effect. In
these countries, the ordinary judiciary has provided a useful and im-
portant check on arbitrary government action.3 9 Indeed, Argentine
and Brazilian judges have occasionally utilized their power of judicial
review to oppose major executive policies, producing serious clashes.
The judiciary has sometimes been purged as a result of these battles
with overbearing executives. For example, a Peron-dominated Congress
impeached the entire Argentine Supreme Court of Justice in 1946
after it invalidated several statutes and released numerous political
prisoners.40 Since Brazil's military takeover in 1964, the Supreme Fed-
eral Tribunal has sought to preserve constitutional guarantees by
invalidating portions of the National Security Law and by releasing
political prisoners on writs of habeas corpus. A number of these
decisions have aroused the ire of military hard-liners in the govern-
ment, who have retaliated by packing and unpacking the Tribunal's
membership. First, in 1965, they increased the Tribunal's membership
38. Constituiao art. 42 (VII) (Brazil, 1969). Constituil-3o arL 64 provides that it
is incumbent upon the Federal Senate to suspend the execution, wholly or in part,
of any law or decree declared unconstitutional by final decision of the Supreme
Federal Tribunal. This measure, which originated in the 1934 Constitution, gives the
Senate the task of rendering inoperative, erga oinnes, the laws and norns which the
Judiciary refrains from applying, in casu, because of the defect of unconstitutionality.
39. Examination of the en banc constitutional decisions of the Colombian Supreme
Court from 1910 through 1962 reveals that the Court invalidated, in whole or in part,
the challenged legislation in 100 out of the 225 popular actions which it decided on
the merits. See 1 & 2 N. PINEDA, JURISPRUDENCIA CONSrrtccIONAL DE LA CoP.TE Suz'arItE
DE JusrIclA (1963). According to this study, there were only 329 cases from 1910 to
1962 involving en banc constitutional decisions of the Colombia Supreme Court. Three
dealt with permission of the executive to leave the country, and twenty.five concerned
legislation vetoed on constitutional grounds. In seventy-six of the remaining popular
actions, the Supreme Court avoided the merits.
While there have been many exaggerated claims about the efficacy of the Mexican
amparo, a recent examination of 3700 amparo decisions in which the President of the
Republic was a party found that only a little more than 1200 (34 per cent) granted
the requested relief. P. GONZALEZ CAsANOvA, DEsOCDAC" i MExmco 21-24 (1970). The
value of the underlying data is rather suspect in view of the Mexican practice of naming
the President as a purely formal party in some actions (am paro contra Iees).
40. See Leonhard, The 1946 Purge of the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice, 4
INwTR-AmER. Ecox. AFFAIRS 73 (1964). In 1957, after Per6n's ouster, the Lonardi pro-
visional government fired the entire Supreme Court, this time without benefit of the
impeachment process. The process was repeated in 1966 after the revolution that brought
the military government of General Juan Carlos Ongarlia to power. See generally INsn.
TUTo DE CiENctA POLrrlCA, L REvoLuci6N ARGENTINA (1966).
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from 11 to 16. Then, as the Tribunal remained defiantly independent,
they forced three members into retirement in 1968.41
The Argentine and Brazilian experiences suggest not only that such
institutions are exceedingly fragile, but also that they may survive oli
paper long after they lose all practical effect. They demonstrate,
moreover, that the real success of the courts depends on an uncom-
promising societal commitment to the constitutions they seek to en-
force. When a nation lacks such commitment-or is forced to give it
up-no court can long exercise effective judicial review. Learned
Hand counseled:
[A] society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court
can save; that a society where that spirit flourishes, no court need
save; that in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting
upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end
will perish. 42
Fortunately, many societies are not so riven that they lack internal
moderating forces. Judicial review can be a significant part of the
checking and balancing process, in addition to nudging societies
(through its educational impact) toward greater respect for funda-
mental constitutional principles. Hand's warning nonetheless sug-
gests the need for study of the social and economic conditions con-
ducive to judicial review-an empirical inquiry into what makes
judicial review succeed and what makes it fail. Professor Cappelletti
does not provide such a study; nor does he promise it. But his work
will be of immense value in providing a theoretical framework for
further thought and research. He has given us a remarkably lucid
and incisive picture of the many forms judicial review has taken,
and may take.
41. R. SCHNEIDER, TIlE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF BRAZIL 172, 275 (1971).
42. Hand, Tire Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Citilization, lit Till;
SPIRIT OF LIBRTY 172, 181 (1. Dilliard ed. 1952).
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